Demonstration of quality of security service awareness for IPsec by Levin, Timothy E. & Irvine, Cynthia E.
Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive
Reports and Technical Reports All Technical Reports Collection
2002-09
Demonstration of quality of security
service awareness for IPsec
Levin, Timothy E.
Monterey, California. Naval Postgraduate School
http://hdl.handle.net/10945/492
NPS-CS-02-005 
NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL 
Monterey, California 
, 
Demonstration of Quality of Security Service 
Awareness for IPsec 
by 
Evdoxia Spyropoulou, Timothy E. Levin, Cynthia E. Irvine 
September 2002 
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. 
Prepared for: Defense Advanced Research Project Agency 
Advanced Technology Organization 
20021115 022 
NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL 
Monterey , California 93 943 -5 000 




This report was prepared for and funded by the Naval Postgraduate School Center for 
Information Systems Security (INFOSEC) Studies and Research (NPS CISR) . 
This report was prepared by: 
Research Associate 
C nthia E. Irvine 
Associate Professor 
Reviewed by: 
Neil C. Rowe 
Professor 
Department of Computer Science 
Department of Compu Science v 
~ Timothy E. Levi 
Research Asspdate Professor 
Released by: 
Associate Provoa and 
Dean of Research 
I Form approved 
1. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave blank) 2. REPORT DATE 
September 2002 
REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE 
3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED 
Technical Report 
.. 
OMB NO 0704-0 188 
I I 
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE 
Demonstration of Quality of Security Service Awareness for IPsec 
6. AUTHOR(S) 
Evdoxia Spyropoulou, Timothy E. Levin and Cynthia E. Irvine 
7: PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 
Center for Information Systems Security Studies and Research (CISR) 
Naval Postgraduate School, 833 Dyer Road, Monterey, CA 93943 
9. SPONSORINGlMONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 
D ARPNATO 
CHATS Program 
3701 North Fairfax Drive 
Arlington, VA 22203-1714 
11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES 
5. FUNDING 
MIPR NO. 00-E583 




AGENCY REPORT NUMBER 
12a. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT 
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited 
12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE 
Quality of Security Service (QoSS) refers to the ability to provide security services according to user and system preferences, policies and 
conditions. Thus, security can be managed as a responsive “service” for which quantitative measurement of service “efficiency” is 
possible. We present our demonstration of how a specific underlying security mechanism, IPsec, can be modulated to provide different 
levels for security in response to changing QoSS requirements. 
14. SUBJECT TERMS 
KeyNote, IPsec, computer security, communications security, quality of service, security policy 
17. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION 18. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION 19. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION 





20. LIMITATION OF 
ABSTRACT 
Unclassified I Unclassified I Unclassified I Unclassified 
NSN 7540-01-280-5800 Standard Form 298 (Rev. 2-89) 
Prescribed by ANSI Std 239-18 
Demonstration of Quality of Security Service Awareness for IPsec 
Evdoxia Spyropoulou Timothy Levin Cynthia Irvine 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, CA 
1. Introduction 
If a Quality of Service (QoS) dimension is supported, then applications and/or users can request or specify a level of 
service for one or more attributes of this dimension, and the underlying QoS control mechanism should be capable of 
entering into an agreement to deliver those services at the-requested levels. 
Quality of Security Service (QoSS) refers to the ability to provide security services according to user and system 
preferences and policies. This way security and security requests can be managed as a responsive “service” for which 
quantitative measurement of service “efficiency” is possible. The enabling technology for both QoSS and a security- 
adaptable infiastructure is variant security, or the ability of security mechanisms and services to allow the amount, 
kind or degree of security to vary, within predefined ranges [ 11. 
In previous work [2][3] we have described how variant security can be offered and presented to applications and users 
in an organized manner. Two abstractions were introduced: 
an operational mode parameter, Network Mode, which represents the influence external conditions and network 
status could have on the security policy and security services applicable to the task: for example under certain 
conditions, an administrator may be willing to accept more (or less) security for a given application. Example 
values for this parameter are: normal, impacted, emergency. 
a Security Level parameter, which represents the choices available to users for the security variables within the 
value ranges that the policy permits for this Security Level. Example values for this parameter are: “high”, 
. “medium”, “low”. 
The selections for the Network Mode and Security Level parameters are mapped to detailed mechanism invocations 
via a translation matrix. 
As a proof of concept we want to demonstrate how an underlying specific security mechanism can be modulated to 
provide different levels for security in response to QoSS requests from users. In the next paragraphs we present our 
demonstration of QoSS awareness for XPsec. In the demo QoSS conditions are linked to IPsec, so that we can adjust 
the kind of security services provided to applications according to QoSS “handles”, like the network mode and/or the 
security level. 
In section 2 we provide some Psec background and describe how QoSS notions can be linked to this security 
mechanism. Section 3 gives a brief description of the demo’s functionality. Section 4 discusses the IPsec’s Security 
Policy Database and how to put rules into it. In sections 5 and 6 we discuss Internet Key Exchange daemon’s 
configuration and policy issues. Section 7 presents the functionality of the QoSS management module. Display of 
traffic data and of established security parameters is discussed in sections 8 and 9. Section 10 contains a detailed list of 
demonstration steps and files. 
We’ve included in two Appendixes some OpenBSD specific information we considered useful for reference purposes. 
Appendix A contains installation guidelines and Appendix B information for setting up a Certificate Authority and 
generating keys and certificates. 
It should be noted that for our demo we use the IPsec implementation of OpenJ3SD version 2.9. 
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2. IPsec and QoSS 
As described in [4] "IPsec provides security services at the IP layer by enabling a system to select required security 
protocols, determine the algorithm(s) to use for the service(s), and put in place any cryptographic keys required to 
provide the requested services. IPsec can be used to protect one or more ''paths" between a pair of hosts, between a pair 
of security gateways, or between a security gateway and a host. [. . .] 
'*The set of security services that IPsec can provide includes access control, connectionless integrity, data origin 
authentication, rejection of replayed packets (a form of partial sequence integrity), confidentiality (encryption), and 
limited traffic flow confidentiality. Because these services are provided at the IP layer, they can be used by any higher 
layer protocol." 
IPsec provides traffic security ''through the use of two traffic security protocols, the Authentication Header (AH) and 
the Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP), and through the use of cryptographic key management procedures and 
protocols. The set of IPsec protocols employed in any context, and the ways in which they are employed, will be 
determined by the security and system requirements of users, applications, and/or sites/organizations. 
"When these mechanisms are correctly implemented and deployed, they ought not to adversely affect users, hosts, and 
other Internet components that do not employ these security mechanisms for protection of their traffic. These 
mechanisms also are designed to be algorithm-independent. This modularity pep i t s  selection of different sets of 
algorithms without affecting the other parts of the implementation. For example, different user communities may select 
different sets of algorithms (creating cliques) if required." [4] 
The IPsec mechanism provides services, including confidentiality, integrity and authenticity, through the establishment 
of Security Associations (SA) among the entities that wish to communicate. The SA is a "simplex connection that 
affords security services to the traffic carried by it" and it essentially is "a management construct used to enforce a 
security policy in the IPsec environment" [4]. There is a set of parameters associated with each SA, which includes, 
among others: SA lifetime, encryption and/or authentication algorithms and keys, and protocol mode 
(tunnel/transport). The SAs can be generated manually, but that approach does not scale well. The Internet Key 
Exchange (IKE) along with the Internet Security Association and Key Management Protocol (ISAKMP) address the 
problem of establishing and maintaining SAs through the use of an automated daemon. 
Information relevant to SAs and their establishment is stored in two databases in IPsec: the Security Policy Database 
(SPD) and the Security Association Database (SAD). The SPD l'specifies the policies that determine the disposition of 
all IP traffic inbound or outbound" from a communicating entity. The SAD "contains parameters that are associated 
with each active security association". 
The IPsec protocols themselves do not include an approach for managing the policies that control which host is 
allowed to establish SAs with another host and what kind of characteristics the SAs should have. We are using the 
OpenBSD's implementation of IPsec. This implementation addresses the SA management problem by including a trust 
management system, KeyNote, and providing an additional check in the IPsec processing: it makes sure that the SAs to 
be created agree with a local security policy (that can be expressed in the trust management system's language) 
151 [61[71. 
When IPsec SAs are established between two entities wishing to communicate, they are used until their negotiated 
lifetime expires (if the SAs are not for some reason violently intermpted/discarded). But the characteristics of the 
negotiated SAs cannot respond to dynamic modifications of the environment's security requirements, for example they 
cannot adapt to changes in threat conditions, critical time transmissions, and network congestiodtraffic. 
To have a QoSS aware IPsec, we enable the IKE daemon to negotiate SAs, and enable the Trust Management System 
to enforce local policy for them, in accordance with the system's QoSS parameters (network mode, security level). 
Also if there is a change in a QoSS parameter, currently active SAs must be renegotiated to conform to the current set 
of security requirements (as expressed by the local policy). 
In Figure 1 we can see the components for a QoSS aware IPsec, which will be described in detail in the following 
paragraphs. The QoSS Management Module, which we have added, is responsible for fetching the current selections 
2 
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for the network mode and the security level and updating the IKE daemon’s configuration data and KeyNote’s local 
security policy. Furthermore it signals the IKE daemon to use from then on the new configuration data and local policy 
for SA negotiations, to remove currently active SAs (if any) and to notify the peer’s daemon that these SAs are no 
longer valid, so that renegotiation of SAs can proceed [8]. 
I IPOutput Ro tine I 
I I I 
SAD J 
IPSec 






-.- .-.___._._.-. -.*  
’.- .-.-._________.-... r La 
Figure 1 : .QoSS awareness for IPsec 
3. Demo Overview 
In our proof of concept demonstration, the IPsec processing for three specific applications varies in response to a 
Security Level QoSS parameter. We display responsiveness to a system status change by adjusting the values of 
security variables, like encryption algorithm used for ESP processing and authentication algorithm used for AH 
processing [ 81. 
We have three example applications in our system: f i nge r ,  t e l n e t  and ping.  In the paragraphs below we 
describe our security policy requirements for each of them. 
0 
ping  does not utilize any security services 
t e h e  t may use the confidentiality service provided by the ESP protocol of IPsec. One of the security attributes 
for which we have choices is the encryption algorithm, it could be any of the: DES, 3DES, RC4, IDEA, CAST, 
BLO WFISH, 3IDEA, or AES. 
Our security policy could say that we can only utilize these algorithms: DES, 3DES, AES and a further refinement 
in the policy, that takes into account the notion of network modes, could say: 
-in Normal Mode: 
-in Impacted Mode: 
DES, 3DES, AES 
no encryption, DES, 3DES 
3 
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-in Emergency Mode: 
So the system is in one of the above modes and the user/application could request any of the available by the mode 
choices for the encryption algorithm. We could go ahead and do the mapping to Security Levels for each Network 
Mode and we illustrate this for the Impacted Mode: 
- Low Security Level in Impacted Mode: no encryption 
- Medium Security Level in Impacted Mode: DES 
- High Security Level in Impacted Mode: 3DES 
f i n g e r  may use the integrity service provided by the AH protocol of IPsec. One of the security attributes for 
which we have choices is the authentication algorithm, it could be any of the: HMAC-MDS, HMC-SHA, HMAC- 
RIPE-MD, DES-MC, or KPDK. So if our policy for the Impacted Mode says that available choices are: no 
authentication, HMAC-MDS, HMAC-SHA, the security levels could be mapped as: 
AES (in this case the range is degenerate). 
- Low Security Level in Impacted Mode: no authentication 
- Medium Security Level in Impacted Mode: HMAC-MDS 
- High Security Level in Impacted Mode: HMAC-SHA 
So for the sake of simplicity we assume that our system is in Impacted Mode and we apply different IPsec processing 
to the applications in response to the Security Level parameter, as seen in Table 1 : we apply no IPsec processing to the 
traffic of any of the applications when the Security Level is Low. For Medium security, f i n g e r  traffic is 
authenticated with HMAC-MDS and we encrypt t e l n e t  traffic with DES. If we switch to High security, f i n g e r  
traffic is authenticated with HMAC-SHA and we encrypt t e l n e t  traffic with 3DES. 
Table 1 : IPsec Processing for different security levels 
Finger  NO IPsec processing AH processk 
HMAC-MD5 
No IPsec processing No IPsec processing I I Ping 
HIGH 
ESP processing with 
3DES 
AH processing with 
HMAC-SHA 
No IPsec processing 
4. Getting Rules into the Security Policy Database 
"Ultimately, a security association is a management construct used to enforce a security policy in the IPsec 
environment. Thus an essential element of SA processing is an underlying Security Policy Database (SPD) that 
specifies what services are to be offered to IP datagrams and in what fashion[. . .] 
"The SPD must be consulted during the processing of all traffic (inbound and outbound), including non-IPsec traffic. 
In order to support this, the SPD requires distinct entries for inbound and outbound traffic. An SPD must discriminate 
among traffic that is afforded IPsec protection and traffic that is allowed to bypass IPsec. This applies to the IPsec 
protection to be applied by a sender and to the IPsec protection that must be present at the receiver. For any outbound 
or inbound datagram, three processing choices are possible: discard, bypass IPsec, or apply IPsec. The first choice 
refers to traffic that is not allowed to exit the host, traverse the security gateway, or be delivered to an application at 
all. The second choice refers to traffic that is allowed to pass without additional IPsec protection. The third choice 
4 
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refers to traffic that is afforded IPsec protection, and for such traffic the SPD must specify the security services to be 
provided, protocols to be employed, algorithms to be used, etc. [. . .] 
"Specifically, every inbound or outbound packet is subject to processing by IPsec and the SPD must specify what 
action will be taken in each case. Thus the administrative interface must allow the user (or system administrator) to 
specify the security processing to be applied to any packet entering or exiting the system, on a packet by packet basis." 
The SPD can be thought of as similar to a packet filter where the actions decided upon are the activation of SA 
processes [9]. In OpenBSD it is implemented as an extension to the routing table (Figure 2). Changes to the SPD can 
be made manually through the ipsecadm utility. Furtherinore, the IKE daemon can cause modifications to the SPD. 
In both cases the PF-KEY API is used [ 101. 
[41 
G = ? A  Manual Keying 
PF-KEY Implemented as extension 
to routing table Key Management 
Daemons 
Figure 2: Security Policy Database in OpenBSD 
Some details for the ipsecadm f l o w  command of Openl3SD that manages the SPD can be found below: 
"ipsecadm flow: Create a flow determining what security parameters a packet should have (input or output). 
Allowed modifiers are: -src, -ds t ,  -proto,  -addr, - t r anspor t ,  - spor t ,  -dport ,  - de le te ,  
- i n ,  -out, -deny, - s r c id ,  -ds t id ,  - s r c id  type, -ds t id  type ,  -use, - acquire ,  - 
r equ i re ,  -dontacq, -permit, and -bypass. The n e t s t a t  (1) c%nmand shows all specified flows. 
Flows are directional, and the - i n  and -out modifiers are used to specify the direction. By default, flows are 
assumed to apply to outgoing packets. The kernel will attempt to find an appropriate Security Association from those 
already present (an SA that matches the destination address, if set, and the security protocol). If the destination address 
is set to all zeroes (0.0.0.0) or left unspecified, the destination address from the packet will be used to locate an SA (the 
source address is used for incoming flows). For incoming flows, the destination address (if specified) should point to 
the expected source of the SA (the remote SA peer). If no such SA exists, key management daemons will be used to 
generate them if - acquire or - requi re  were used. If - acquire  was used, traffic will be allowed out (or in) and 
IPsec will be used when the relevant SAs have been established. If - requi re  was used, traffic will not be allowed in 
or out until it is protected by IPsec. If -dontacq was used, traffic will not be allowed in or out until it is protected by 
IPsec, but key management will not be asked to provide such an SA. The -proto argument (by default set to esp) 
will be used to determine what type of SA should be established. A bypass or permit  flow is used to specify a flow 
5 
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for which IPsec processing will be bypassed, i.e packets willheed not be processed by any SAs. For permi t  flows, 
additional modifiers are restricted to: -addr, - t r anspo r t ,  - sport ,  -dport ,  - in,  -out, and - de le te .  A 
deny flow is used to specify classes of packets that must be dropped (either on output or input) without further 
processing. deny takes the same additional modifiers as bypass" [ll]. 
In our demonstration we use the file vpn28 ah a (Figure 3) to put the rules into the SPD. This script must be 
executed on the initiator's side before traffic from t%e applications is generated, otherwise no IPsec processing will be 
applied to that traffic. It establishes four flows: 
One pair for t e h e  t traffic, that mandates ESP IPsec processing for incoming and outgoing t e 1 n e t  packets. 
One pair for f i n g e r  traffic, that mandates AH IPsec processing for incoming and outgoing f i n g e r  packets. 
In both cases, traffic from these applications will not be allowed in or out until it is protected by IPsec. 
For traffic of any other application to, be subject to IPsec processing, a similar pair of flows should be established. 
Since no rule for p ing is present, it will be allowed to bypass IPsec. 
NOTE: In OpenBSD 2.9, it is not possible to apply diflerent ESP processing to two applications (or different AH 
processing to two applications). That is, if a pair of ESP SAs has already been established, they will be used for 
subsequent traffic requiring ESPprocessing. This is due to unfinished code in OpenBSD development and it will be 
addressed in future versions. That's why for  the moment our demo displays diflerent processing for two applications 
only, one with ESP, the other with AH. 
On the responder's side there is no need to initially load rules into the SPD. Once the SAs are negotiated and 
established, rules are automatically put into the SPD. 
NOTE: In [.5] a similar behavior is described for th.e initiator's side. If this was accurate, then there would not be a 
need to initial6 populate the SPD at the initiator. The policy expressed in KeyNote policy files should be enough to 
trigger the negotiations. This approach is not yet implemented in OpenBSD, that's why it's necessary to execute a 
scriptfile, like that of Figure 3. 
' 
# ! /bin/sh 
#Set-up flows for the two specific hosts 
#Use for defining applications FINGER and TELNET 
# ESP for TELNET 
# AH for FINGER 
# -dport for egress traffic 
# -sport for ingress traffic 




# Create the host-to-host flow 
#egress flow for finger 
Sipsecadm flow -dst $REMOTE-HOST -proto ah \ 
-addr $LOCAL-HOST 255.255.255.255 \ 
$REMOTE-HOST 255.255.255.255 \ 
-transport tcp -dport 79 \ 
-src $LOCAL-HOST -out -require 
#ingress flow for finger 
Sipsecadm flow -dst $REMOTE-HOST -proto ah \ 
-addr $REMOTE HOST 255.255.255.255 \ 
$LOCAL-HOST 255.255.255.255 \ 
-transport tcp -sport I 9  \ 
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-src $REMOTE-HOST -in -require 
#egress flow for telnet 
Sipsecadm flow -dst $REMOTE-HOST -proto esp \ 
-addr $LOCAL-HOST 255.255.255.255 \ 
$REMOTE HOST 255.255.255.255 \ 
-transport tcp -dport 23 \ 
-src $LOCAL-HOST -out -require 
#ingress flow for telnet 
Sipsecadm flow -dst $REMOTE-HOST -proto esp \ 
-addr $REMOTE-HOST 255.255.255.255 \ 
$LOCAL-HOST 255.255.255.255 \ 
-transport tcp -sport 23 \ 
-src $REMOTE-HOST -in -require 
exit 0 
Figure 3: Script file with rules for SPD - vpn28 - -  ah a 
By issuing the command 
netstat -rn -f encap 
we can observe the routing tables (-r option) and more specifically, the ones related to IPsec (-f encap option). 
These are the rules that we have added to 'the SPD (Figure 4). 
Routing tables 
Encap : 
Source Port Destination Port Proto SA(Address/Proto/Type/Direction) 
w.x.y.z/32 23 a.b.c.d/32 0 6 - w.x.y.z/50/require/in 
w.x.y.z/32 I9 a.b.c.d/32 0 6 w.x.y.z/5l/require/in 
a.b.c.d/32 0 W.X. y.z/32 23 6 w.x.y.z/50/require/out 
a.b.c.d/32 0 w.x.y.z/32 79 6 w.x.y.z/5l/require/out 
Figure 4: Flows in output of netstat command 
5. Configuring the IKE Daemon 
The IKE daemon isakmpd is the key exchange and SA negotiation mechanism for IPsec. It automatically manages 
the exchange of cryptographic keys that would otherwise have to be manually managed with the ipsecadm utility. 
isakmpd daemon is used when two systems need to automatically setup a pair of Security Associations (SAs) for 
securely communicating using IPsec. IKE operates in two stages: 
Phase 1 (Main or Identity Protection Mode) - "the two IKE daemons establish a secure link between themselves, fully 
authenticating each other and establishing key material for encrypting/authenticating future communications between 
them. This step is typically only performed once for every pair of IKE daemons". 
Phase 2 (Quick Mode) - Yhe two IKE daemon create the pair of SAs for the parties that wish to communicate using 
IPsec. These parties may be the hosts the IKE daemons run on, a host and a network behind a firewall, or two networks 
behind their respective firewalls. At this stage, the exact parameters of the SAs (e.g., algorithms to use, encapsulation 
mode, lifetime) and the identities of the communicating parties (hosts, networks, etc.) are specified. The reason of 
existence of Quick Mode is to allow for fast SA setup, once the more heavyweight Main Mode has been completed. 
Generally, Quick Mode uses the key material derived from Main Mode to provide keys to the IPsec transforms to be 
used. Alternatively, a new Diffie-Hellman computation may be performed (significantly slowing down the exchange, 
but at the same time providing Perfect Forward Secrecy (PFS))" [ 121. 
isakmpd. conf is the konfiguration file for the isakmpd daemon managing security association and key 
management for the IPsec layer of the kernel's networking stack and it's typically placed in the /etc/isakmpd 
7 
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directory [13]. The file is of a well known type of format called .INI style. This format consists of sections, each 
beginning with a line looking like: 
[Section name] 
Between the brac,kets is the name of the section following this section header. Inside a section many taghalue pairs can 
be stored, each one looking like: 
Tag=Value 
It should be noted that some parts of the IKE daemon's configuration are auto-generated. Some predefined section 
names are recognized by the daemon, voiding the need to fully specify the Main Mode transforms and Quick Mode 
suites, protocols and transforms in the isakmpd . conf file: 
For Main Mode 
For Quick Mode 
All auto-generated values can be overridden by manual entries by using the same section and tag names in the 
configuration file. 
For more details on what each tag name means, [13] and [9] should be consulted. Of special interest though is the 
Default-Phase-2-Suites tag. This tag describes a list of Phase 2 suites that will be used when establishing dynamic SAs. 
If left unspecified, QM-ESP-3DES-SHA-PFS-SUITE is used as the default. From this list the set of proposals for SAs 
that the initiator's IKE daemon sends to the other daemon is formed. 
In our QoSS demo we want a different list of Phase 2 suites to be proposed to the other IPsec node, for medium and 
high security level (for low security level no IPsec processing is required by our policy). So we are using a predefined 
set of alternate IKE configuration data and local security policies that describe the characteristics we want our SAs to 
have for each security level and we make active the proper isakmpd. conf file through our QoSS module. The 
different IKE configuration data that we are using can be seen in Figures 5 and 6 .  
The main difference of these files is at the Default-Phase-2-Suites tag. The detailed breakdown and description of the 
. suites is not necessary for the ESP suites used, since they are part of the auto-generated configuration. Only values 
overriden are needed to be present. The AH suites we use though should be explicitly defined (auto-generated info 
does not include them). Generally it is suggested as a good practice to fully describe the proposed suites in the 
is akmpd . con f file, to be sure of the various values used. 
#isakmpd. conf .medium 
{DES,BLF,SDES, CAST}-{MDS,SHA}[-{DSS,RSA-SIG}J 








#set-up to work specifically with responder with new configuration style 
[Phase 11 









me h i t  as di g oa t 
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[Default-main-mode] 
joI= IPSEC 
3XCHANGE-TY PE= I D-PROT 
rransf orms= 3DES-SHA 










rransf orms= QM-AH-MD5-PFS-XF 
PROTOCOL-ID= IPSEC-AH 




















/ e t c / is  a kmpd / ca / 
/ e t c / i s akmpd/ ce r t s / 
Figure 5: isakmpd. conf on Initiator for medium security level 










#set-up to work specifically with responder with new configuration style 
[Phase 11 
w .x. y. z= Peer-w.x.y.z/a.b.c.d 
[Peer-w.x.y.z/a.b.c.d] 
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Transforms= 3 DES - SHA 
Address= w.x.y.z 
Transport= UdP 





# Quick mode protocols 
PROTOCOL-ID- 
[QM-ESP-3DES-SHA-PFS] 
I PS EC-E S P 
Transforms= QM-ESP-3DES-SHA-PFS-XF 
[QM-AH-SHA-PFS] 
Trans forms= QM-AH-SHA-PFS-XF 
PROTOCOL-ID= IPSEC-AH 
# Quick mode transforms 
TRANS FORM- I D= 3DES 
ENCAPSULATION-MODE= TUNNEL 
AUTHENTICATION-ALGORITHM= HMAC-SHA 
GROUP-DESCRIPTION= MODP 1024 
Life= 
[QM-ESP-3DES-SHA-PFS-XF] 













Private- key= /etc/isakmpd/private/initiator.key 
/ e t c / is a kmpd / ca / 
/ e t c / is a kmpd / ce rt s / 
Figure 6: isakmpd. conf on Initiator for high security level 
The configuration file for the IKE daemon of the responder can be seen in Figure 7, where descriptions of various 
suites are kept for illustration purposes (it's not necessary to have all of them in the file). 
[General ]
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style 
~~ ~~ - ~~~~~~ 
#setup to work specifically with initiator with new configuration style 
[Phase 11 
P . b . c . d= Peer-a.b.c.d/w.x.y.z 






Jonf iguration= Default-main-mode 
4uthentication= me kmi t a s digoa t 
[Default-main-mode] 
)OI= IPSEC 




3XCHANGE-TY PE= QUICK-MODE 
Suites= QM-ESP-DES-MD5-PFS-SUITE 



































Protocols= QM-AH- SHA 
[QM-AH-SHA-PFS-SUITE] 
Protocols= QM-AH-SHA-PFS 
# AH f ESP 
[QM-AH-MD5-ESP-DES-SUITE] 





# Quick mode protocols 
# DES 
[QM-ESP-DES] 
PROTOCOL-ID= I P SEC-ES P 
Transforms= ’ QM-ESP-DES-XF 
[ QM-ESP-DES-MD5 ] 









Trans f oms= 
[QM-ESP-3DES-SHA 
[QM-ESP-DES-MD5-PFS] 













I PSE C-E S P 
# CAST 
[QM-ESP-CAST-SHA] 
PROTOCOL-ID= I PSEC-E S P 
Transforms= QM-ESP-CAST-SHA-XF 
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# ESP DES 
[QM-ESP-DES-XF] 









TRANSFORMWID= DE S 
























# AH MD5 
[QM-AH-MDS] 
PROTOCOL ID= 
Trans f or&= 
[ QM-AH-MD5-PFS ] 
PROTOCOL-ID= 
Trans f oms= 
# AH SHA 
[ QM-AH-SHA] 
PROTOCOL-ID= 
Trans f oms= 










Trans f oms= QM-AH-SHA-PFS-XF 
# Quick mode transforms 
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[ QM-ESP-3DES-SHA-PFS-XFl 
TRANS FORM-I D= 3 DES 
ENCAPSULATION-MODE= TUNNEL 
AUTHENTICATION ALGORITHM= HMAC-SHA 












Life= LI FE-60-SECS 
[QM-ESP-CAST-MDS-XF] ' 
TRAN FORM-I D= CAST 
ENCAPSULATION-MODE= TUNNEL 
AUTHENTICATION - ALGORITHM= HMAC-MDS 





SROUP-DESCRIPTION= MODP 1'024 
Life= LIFEr60-SECS 
[QM-ESP-CAST-MD5-PFS-XF] 
r RAN FORM-I D= CAST 
ENCAPSULATION-MODE= TUNNEL 
4UTHENTICATION_ALGORITHM= HMAC-MD5 
SROUP-DESCRIPTION= MODP-7 68 
Life= 
1 AH 
[ QM-AH-MD5 -X F ] 







SROUP-DESCRIPTION= MODP-7 68 
VJTHENTICATION-ALGORITHM= HMAC-MD5 
Life= LI FE-3 600-SECS 
L I FE- 6 0-S E C S 
[ QM-AH-SHA-XF] 




[ QM- AH- SHA- P FS -XF ] 
PRANSFORM-I D= SHA 
ZNCAPSULATION-MODE= TUNNEL 
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ZROUP-DESCRIPTION= MODP-1024 
RUTHENTICATION - ALGORITHM= HMAC-SHA 
Life= 
[LIFE 30 SECS] 
LIFE-DURATION= 










[ LIFE-3 600-SECS ] 
LIFE-TYPE= 
LIFE-DURATION= 






























/ et c / i s a kmpd / ce r t s / 
Figure 7: isakmpd. conf on Responder 
A couple of observations for these configuration files: 
Peers authenticate each other through a pre-shared secret. Certificates could also be used (see Appendix B for some 
info). In that case the transform suite used for Phase 1 (Main Mode) should change to 3DES-SHA-RSA-SIG for 
example, and the Authentication tag should be removed. 
The lifetime of the Initiator's proposals is 1 hour. This way, issues like expiration handling and re-initiation of 
negotiations from any of the two peers were not addressed. Further experimentation is needed. 
6. Enforcing Policy with KeyNote Trust Management System 
KeyNote, a trust management system [6] ,  is used in Openl3SD for enforcing the local policy that controls which host is 
allowed to establish SAs with another host and what kind of characteristics the SAs should have, whereas, the SPD is 
used for selecting traffic that needs IPsec processing and possible peer negotiation. IKE is used for performing that 
negotiation. When two IKE daemons negotiate for establishing an SA, the initiator sends across proposals for the SAs 
he is willing to establish. As mentioned in [ 121 "IKE proposals are ''suggestions" by the initiator of an exchange to the 
responder as to what protocols and attributes should be used on a class of packets. For example, a given exchange may 
ask for ESP with 3DES and MD5 and AH with SHAl (applied successively on the same packet), or just ESP with 
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Blowfish and RIPEMD-160. The responder examines the proposals and determines which of them are acceptable, 
according to policy and any credentials. The goal of security policy for IKE is thus to determine, based on local policy 
(provided in the isakmpd. policy file), credentials provided during the IKE exchanges (or obtained through other 
means), the SA attributes proposed during the exchange, and perhaps other (side-channel) information, whether a pair 
of SAs should be installed in the system (in fact, whether both the IPsec SAs and the flows should be installed). For 
each proposal suggested by or to the remote IKE daemon, the KeyNote system is consulted as to whether the proposal 
is acceptable based on local policy and remote credentials (e.g., KeyNote credentials or X509 certificates provided by 
the remote IKE daemon)". 
The local policy is contained in the isakmpd.policy file, which is typically placed in the /etc/isakmpd 
directory. isakmpd . policy is simply a flat ascii file containing KeyNote policy assertions (more details on the 
syntax of this file can be found in [12],[6]). 
The responder selects a proposal, the first one fkom the list of proposals that are sent to him that conforms to his local 
policy (as expressed in isakmpd. policy). He sends this proposal back to the initiator. The initiator checks his own 
i s a kmpd . PO 1 i c y, to make sure that the selected proposal indeed agrees with his local policy. 
In our QoSS demo we want a different local policy to be enforced in the QoSS aware peer, which acts as the initiator, 
for medium and high security level (for low security level we do not require any IPsec processing). As in the case of 
isakmpd . conf , we are using a predefined set of alternate IKE local security policies that describe the characteristics 
we want our SAs to have for each security level and we make active the proper isakmpd . pol icy file through our 
QoSS module. 
The different local policy files we are using can be seen in Figures 8 and 9. The main difference of these files is that 
the is a kmpd . PO 1 icy for medium security level requires DES as the encryption algorithm for t e h e  t traffic and 
MD5 as the authentication algorithm for finger, whilst isakmpd . policy for high security level requires 3DES 
and SHA for the respective cases. 
KeyNote-Version: 2 
Author i z e r : '' POL1 CY I' 
Licensees : "passphrase : mehitasdigoat" 
Conditions: app-domain == "IPsec policy" & &  
( (esp-present == *lyes") & &  
( ( (local-filter-port == "23") I I (remote-filter-port == "23") ) & &  
(esp-enc-alg == "des") ) 
) I I  
( (ah-present == "yes") & &  
( ( .  (local-filter-port == " 79" )  I I (remote-filter-port == 1'79v') ) & &  
(ah-auth-alg == "hmac-md5") ) 
I ) -> " t r u e" ;  
Figure 8: isakmpd. policy on Initiator for medium security level 
KeyNote-Version: 2 
Aut hori zer : "POLICY 
Licensees : "passphrase : mehitasdigoat" 
Conditions: app-domain == "IPsec policy" & &  
( (esp-present == "yes") & &  
( ( (local-filter-port == "23") I I (remote-filterport == "23") ) & &  
(esp-enc-alg == "3des") ) 
1 I I  
( (ah-present == "yes") & &  
( ( (local-filter-port == "79") I I (remote-filter-port == " 7 9" )  ) & &  
(ah-auth-alg == "hmac-sha") ) 
1 -> "true": 
~ ~~ ~ ~~ 
Figure 9: isakmpd.policy on Inititator for high security level 
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The local policy file for the responder can be seen in Figure 10. For SAs to be successfully established for any security 
level of the initiator, the responder's policy should be broad enough to accept the different possible proposals. So this 
IPsec node accepts both DES and 3DES as encryption algorithms and both MD5 and SHA as authenticition 
algorithms. 
KeyNote-Version: 2 
Authorizer : I' POLICY 'I 
Licensees : "pas s phr a s e : me kmi  t a s dig o a t 
Conditions: app-domain == "IPsec policy" & &  
( (esp-present == 'ryes") & &  
( ( (local-filter-port == "23") I I 
(remote-filter-port == "23") ) & &  
( (esp-enc-alg == lrdesl') I I (esp-end-alg == "3des") ) ) 
1 I 1  
( (ah-present == "yesII) & &  
( ( (local-filter-pprt == 1t79" )  I I (remote-filter-port == "79" )  ) & &  
( (ah-auth-alg == "hmac-md5") I I (ah-auth-alg == "hmac-sha") ) ) 
) -> "true": 
Figure 10: isakmpd. policy on Responder 
7. Bringing it All Together: QoSS Management Module 
The events that control i s  akmpd consist of negotiation initiations from a remote party, user input via a FIFO or by 
signals, up-calls from the kernel via a PF-KEY socket, and lastly by scheduled events triggered by timers running out 
(Figure 11) [ 141. From these methods, of special interest for our demo is the user input by signals or via a FIFO. 
Timer scheduled isakmpd 
daemon 





~~ ~~ ~ 
Figure 11 : Controlling events for isakmpd 
We may send signals to the IKE daemon. Currently two such signals are implemented: 
SIGHUP, which re-initializes isakmpd. 
isakmpd. conf is read when the IKE daemon is first started and configuration information is loaded into the 
daemon's memory for use in generation of SA proposals. isakmpd will reread the configuration file when sent a 
SIGHUP signal. 
Similarly is a kmpd . PO 1 i c y  is read when is a kmpd is first started, and every time it receives a SIGHUP signal. 
The new policies read will be used for all new Phase 2 SAs established from that point on (even if the associated Phase 
1 SA was already established when the new policies were loaded). The policy change will not affect already 
established Phase 2 SAs [ 121. 
SIGUSRl, which generate a report, with status information of the daemon 
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Soifwechange isakmpd. conf and/or isakmpd.policy filesandsenta 
kill -HUP <PID of isakmpd process> 
the daemon will reread these files and take into account from now on the new information contained in them. The 
daemon's process ID is contained in /var/run/isakmpd. pid. 
In order to control the daemon we can also send commands through a FIFO called i sakmpd . f i f 0, which can be 
found in /var/run/isakmpd. f if 0. The commands are one-letter codes followed by arguments [ 151: 
c connect Establish a connection with a peer 
C configure Add or remove configuration entries. 
D debug 
r report Report status information of the daemon 
t teardown Teardown a connection 
Change logging level for a debug class 
The last command is of special importance for our demo to address the problem of stopping already established phase 
2 SAs when the QoSS policy has changed. When we write to the FIFO 
t <connection identifier> 
the daemon removes the pair of SAs associated with the connection from the SA databases and it also notifies the peer 
daemon that these SAs are no longer valid, so that he can also remove them from his databases. The use of this 
command and especially the naming conventions for connection identifiers are not well documented. Through 
experimentation we observed the following: 
-the first pair of SAs established (for incoming and outgoing traffic) is described by "Connection-0" 
-the second pair of SAs established is described by "Connection-1" 
t Connection-0 
t Connection-1 
-the third (chronologically) pair of SAs established is described by "Connection- 1 'I 
-the fourth pair of SAs established is described by "Connection-2" 
t Connection-1 
t Connection-2 
-the fifth (chronologically) pair of SAs established is described by "Connection-2" 
-the sixth pair of SAs established is described by "Connection-3" 
If the commands 
are issued to the isakmpd FIFO and a SIGHUP is sent to the daemon, then for subsequent traffic: 
Again after the FIFO commands 
and a SIGHUP to the daemon 
and so on. 
The code for the QoSS Management Module can be seen in Figure 12. This sh  shell script file gives us an interface 
for changing security level and causing the necessary changes to the IPsec mechanism. The functionality of this 
module has as follows: 
A menu is continuously displayed on the screen, which prompts the user to select a security level. 
When low security level is selected, if the IKE daemon is not running, it is not necessary to take any action, since our 
system does not provide IPsec protection in low security level. If the daemon is running, then through the FIFO we tear 
down existing connections, and through ipsecadm utility we make sure that all SAs and rules are removed from IPsec 
databases. 
When medium security level is selected, first of all we copy to isakmpd. conf the configuration data for medium 
level (contained in isakmpd. conf .medium) and to isakmpd. policy the local policy for medium security level 
(from isakmpd . policy. medium). Then all SAs and rules are removed from IPsec databases. Rules for the flows 
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are loaded to the SPD and then if the daemon was not running we start it. If it was already running, we tear down 
existing connections through the FIFO (to make sure that the peer is notified) and we send a SIGHUP to the daemon to 
force it to read the new Configuration and policy data. Logistics for forming the correct connection identifier are kept. 
Similarly when high security level is selected, first of all we copy to isakmpd. conf the configuration data for high 
level (contained in isakmpd. conf .high) and to isakmpd. policy the local policy for high security level (from 
isakmpd. policy. high). The rest of the steps are similar to those for the medium level. 
NOTE: it should be noted that our demo always assumes that there are two pair of SAs established, one for telnet 
and one for finger traffic, so whenever there is a security level change, it t ies  to delete all of them. This assumes 
that whenever we change mode, we then generate both telnet and finger traffic, before changing again level. The 
akward logistics for the connection index forced this partial handling. A more complete approach would be to actually 
check how many SAs (through /kern/ipsec info, see next section) are currently established and tear down 
connections accordingly. 
clear 




echo " SECURITY LEVEL MENU 
echo 'I 






echo "\tPlease select Security Level:\t\t\t\t****************" 
echo I' \ t \ t \ t \ t \ t \t \ t \ t * \ t \ t \ t \t * '' 
echo 'I\ t \ t 1. LOW\t \t \t\ t\t \ t* 
echo "\t\t 2. MEDIUM\t\t\t\t\t*\t\t\t\t*" 
echo I' \ t \ t 'I 
echo "\t\t 0.  Cancel" 
echo qtvI 
echo "\tSelect by pressing a number and then ENTER : 'I 
SECURITY LEVEL : \t "$NETWORK-MODE"\t*" 
echo "\t\t 3. H I G H \ t \ t \ t \ t \ t * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * , * * * * * * * * * * * * * l l  
if [ $NETWORK-MODE != "Low" ] 
then 
echo "changing mode to LOW" 
NETWORK-MODE= " Low" 
echo "Entered LOW actions" 
if s-daemon-runs 
then 
echo "t Connect ion-"$CONN-INDEX 
echo "t Connection-"$CONN-INDEX > /var/run/isakmpd.fifo 
echo "t Connection-"$ ( ($CONN-INDEX+l) ) 
echo "t Connection-"$ ( ($CONN-INDEX+l) ) > /var/run/isakmpd. fifo 
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echo "...flushing current IPSec settings" 
ipsecadm flush 
fi 
echo "System is already in LOW mode" 
else 
fi 
if [ $NETWORK-MODE != "Medium" ] 
then 
NETWORK-MODE= "Medium" 
echo "Entered MEDIUM actions" 
echo ''I' 
echo "...fetching MEDIUM level configuration info" 
cp /etc/isakmpd/isakmpd.conf.medium /etc/isakmpd/isakmpd.conf 
cp /etc/isakmpd/isakmpd.policy.medium /etc/isakmpd/isakmpd.policy 





echo "t Connection-"$CONN-INDEX 
echo "t Connection-"SCONN-INDEX > /var/run/isakmpd.fifo 
CONN INDEX=$ ( ($CONN-INDEX+l) ) 
echo-"t Connection-"SCONN-INDEX 
echo "t Connection-"$CONN-INDEX > /var/run/isakmpd.fifo 
echo ". . .rereading configuration info", 
kill -HUP 'cat /var/run/isakmpd.pid' 
echo "...starting automated keying daemon isakmpd" 
is a kmpd 
else 
fi 
echo "System is already in MEDIUM mode" 
else 
fi 
if [ $NETWORK-MODE != "High" J 
then 
NETWORK-MODE="High" 
echo "Entered HIGH actions" 
echo "" 
echo "...fetching HIGH level configuration info" 
cp /etc/isakmpd/isakmpd.conf.high /etc/isakmpd/isakmpd.conf 
cp /etc/isakmpd/isakmpd.policy.high /etc/isakmpd/isakmpd.policy 





echo "t Connection-"SCONN-INDEX 
echo "t Connection-"SCONN-INDEX > /var/run/isakmpd.fiKo 
CONN-INDEX=$ ( ($CONN-INDEX+l) ) 
echo "t Connection-"$CONN-INDEX 
echo "t Connection-"$CONN-INDEX > /var/run/isakmpd.fifo 
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echo "...rereading configuration info" 
kill -HUP 'cat /var/run/isakmpd.pid' 




echo "System is already in HIGH mode" 
else 
fi 
i - daemon-runs ( ) # returns 0 if isakmpd is running 
ps -ax I grep isakmpd I grep -v grep > daemon-search 
if [ - s  daemon-search I 
then 
echo 'I. . . isakmpd is RUNNING" 
return 0 




i - cleanup() # prepare for exit 
if s-daemon-runs 
' then 
echo "...killing automated keying daemon isakmpd" 
kill 'cat /var/run/isakmpd.pid' 




case $CHOICE in 
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1) s-low ;; 
2) s-medium ; ; 
3) s-high ;; 





* )  'echo "\tWrong selection. The program will terminate" 
esac 




Figure 12: QoSS management module - level28 - fifo 
B. Generating and Displaying Traffic 
The negotiation for establishment of SAs begins when traffic, for which there are rules in the SPD requiring IPsec 
processing, appears, but the appropriate SAs cannot be found in the SAD. 
So in order to trigger the whole process, these commands can be issued at the initiator: 
telnet w. x . y . z for telnet traffic 
finger root@w.x.y. z for finger traffic 
We can observe traffic among the two peers by issuing the command below: 
tcpdump -N -v host a .b .c .d  and w.x.y.2 
tcpdump prints the headers of the packets on a network interface that match a boolean expression [16], in our case 
the packets exchanged among the two IPsec nodes. When no IPsec processing is applied, the t cpdump output can be 
seen in Figure 13, where various info for the packets is visible, among them the application names. 
10:24:49.807580 initiator.4850 > responder.telnet: S 1673683391:1673683391(0) win 16384 <mss 
1460, nop, nop, sackOK, nop, wscale 0, nop, nop, timestamp 1750110177 O> (DF) [tos 0x101 
10: 24:49.808442 responder. telnet > initiator. 4850: S 2761636766:2761636766 (0 )  ack 1673683392 win 
17376 <mss 1460, nop, nop, sackOK, nop, wscale 0, nop, nop, timestamp 1371743825 1750110177> (DF) 
10:24:49.808911 initiator.4850 > responder.telnet: . ack 1 win 17376 <nop,nop,timestamp 
10:24:49.847519 responder.telnet > initiator.4850: P 1:4 (3) ack 1 win 17376 <nop,nop, timestamp 
1371743825 1750110177> (DF) [tos 0x101 
10:24:49.848122 initiator.4850 > responder.telnet: . ack 4 win 17376 <nop,nop,timestamp 
1750110178 1371743825> (DF) [tos OxlO] 
10:24:49.848340 initiator.4850 > responder.telnet: P 1:4(3) ack 4 win 17376 <nop,nop,timestamp 
1750110178 1371743825> (DF) [tos 0x101 
10:24:56.281101 initiator.39402 > responder.finger: S 1810136654:1810136654(0) win 16384 <mss 
1460,nop,nop, sackOK, nop, wscale 0, nop, nop, timestamp 1750110190 O> (DF) 
10:24:56.281969 responder.finger > initiator.39402: S 2729467036:2729467036(0) ack 1810136655 win 
17376 <mss 1460,nop,nop,sack0K,nopfwsca1e O,nop,nop,timestamp 1371743838 1750110190> (DF) 
10:24:56.282450 initiator.39402 > responder.finger: . ack 1 win 17376 <nop,nop,timestamp 
1750110190 1371743838> (DF) 
10:24:56.283221 initiator.39402 > responder.finger: P 1:5(4) ack 1 win 17376 <nop,nop,timestamp 
1750110190 1371743838> (DF) 
10:24:56.307217 responder.finger > initiator.39402: . ack 5 win 17376 <nop,nop,timestamp 
1371743838 1750110190> (DF) 
10:24:56.307698 initiaFor.39402 > responder.finger: P 5:7 (2) ack 1 win 17376 <nop,nop,timestamp 
1750110190 1371743838> (DF) 
10:25:14.750969 initiator > responder: icmp: echo request 
1750110177 1371743825> (DF) [tos 0x101 . I  
. . .  
. . .  
22 
Demonstration of Quality of Security Service Awareness for IPsec 
10:25:14.751128 responder > initiator: icmp: echo reply 
10:25:15.752717 initiator > responder: icmp: echo request 
10:25:15.752872 responder > initiator: icmp: echo reply 
Figure 13: tcpdump output with no IPsec processing 
When IPsec is used for the packets (in medium and high security levels), from the tcpdump output (Figure 14) we 
can only tell whether it is an ESP or AH packet. Ping packets still go in clear, since our policy does not require any 
IPsec processing for them. 
10:26:06.888971 esp initiator > responder spi.Ox2AOA519A seq 1 len 100 
10:26:09.346186 esp initiator > responder spi Ox2AOA519A seq 2 len 100 
10:26:09.347727 esp responder > initiator spi Ox7A82B723 seq 1 len 100 
10:26:09.348684 esp initiator > responder spi Ox2AOA519A seq 3 len 84 
10:26:09.388378 esp responder > initiator spi Ox7A82B723 seq 2 len 92 
10:26:09.430333 esp initiator > responder spi Ox2AOA519A seq 4 len 84 
10:26:09.430728 esp initiator > responder spi Ox2AOA519A seq 5 len 92 
10:26:09.431609 esp responder > initiator spi OxIA82B723 seq 3 len 84 
10:26:09.432186 esp responder > initiator spi OxIA82B723 seq 4 len 108 
10:26:15.790018 ah initiator > responder spi Ox165AAE30 seq 1 len 88 
10:26:20.347206 ah initiator > responder spi Ox165AAE30 seq 2 len 88 
10:26:20.348608 ah responder > initiator spi Ox493C9386 seq 1 len 88 
10:26:20.349497 ah initiator > responder spi Ox165AAE30 seq 3 len 76 
10:26:20.351389 ah initiator > responder spi Ox165AAE30 seq 4 len 80 
10:26:20.3752?2 ah responder > initiator spi Ox493C9386 seq 2 len 76 
10:26:24.733178 initiator > responder: icmp: echo request 
10:26:24.733404 responder > initiator: icmp: echo reply 
10:26:25.737265 initiator > responder: icmp: echo request 
10:26:25.737510 responder > initiator: icmp: echo reply 
10:26:26.746936 initiator > responder: icmp: echo request 
. . .  
... 
Figure 14: tcpdump output with IPsec processing 
A GUI network protocol analyzer, like Ether e a 1 , could also bee used . Ether ea 1 allows interactive browsing of 
packet data from a live network. Like other protocol analyzers, its main window shows 3 views of a packet. It shows a 
summary line, briefly describing what the packet is. A protocol tree is shown, which allows to drill down to exact 
protocol or field of interest. Finally, a hex dump shows exactly what the packet looks like when it goes over the wire 
[ 171. When packets are captured certain filters can be used for selecting the traffic of interest. The Fi 1 t e r s dialog 
allows the creation and modification of filters. So we should create a new filter for capturing the traffic among the 
hosts we are interested by defining as 
Filter string: host <initiator-host-name> and <responder-host-name> 
9. Displaying the Contents of Security Association Database 
As mentioned in [4] "in each IPsec implementation there is a nominal Security Association Database, in which each 
entry defines the parameters associated with one SA. Each SA has an entry in the SAD. For outbound processing, 
entries are pointed to by entries in the SPD. Note that if an SPD entry does not currently point to an SA that is 
appropriate for the packet, the implementation creates an appropriate SA (or SA Bundle) and links the SPD entry to the 
SAD entry. For inbound processing, each entry in the SAD is indexed by a destination IP address, IPsec protocol type, 
and SPI." An SAD entry would include the fields: Destination IP address, IPsec protocol (AH or ESP), Security 
Parameter Index (SPI), Sequence counter, Sequence overflow flag, Anti-replay window info, AH type and info, ESP 
type and info, Lifetime info, Tunnel/transport mode flags, Path MTU info (Figure 15). 
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a hash table in Kernel 
SA identifier set for incoming policy matching -
SA identifier set for outgoing poiicy matching 
SA idextifier tuple 
I * 
Figure 15: Security Association Database in OpenBSD 
In OpenBSD SAD entries can be set manually with the ipsecadm utility, or through automatic key exchange 
daemons, like IKE daemon and Photuris. The SAD is referred to as TDB or TDB table throughout OpenBSD's IPsec 
source code. 
A list of all security associations in the kernel tables can be obtained via the ke rn f s  file < ip sec>  (typically in 
< / kern/ i p s  e c> ). In order to access this file, kern f s should first be mounted, through the command: 
mount -t ke rn f s  /kern  /kern 
This file is continually updated by the kernel and a listing of its typical contents (obtained through the command c a t  
/kern / ipsec)  can be seen in Figure 16. The listing displays four SAs currently established and a description of 
their characteristics. 
Hashmask: 31, policy entries: 2 
SPI = 554d633bI Destination = a.b.c.d, Sproto = 51 
Established 26 seconds ago 
Source = w.x.y.2 
Flags (00011082) = <tunneling,usedtunnel> 
Crypto ID: 3 
xform = <IPsec AH> 
40 bytes processed by this SA 
Last used 21 seconds ago 
Expirations: 
Authentication = <HMAC-MDS> 
Hard expiration(1) in 3574 seconds 
Soft expiration(1) in 3214 seconds 
SPI = 40329317, Destination = a.b.c.d, Sproto = 50 
Established 156 seconds ago 
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. - ... . 
Flags (00011082) = <tunneling,usedtunnel> 
Crypto ID: 1 
xform = <IPsec ESP> 
Encryption = <DES> 
Authentication = <HMAC-MD5> 
200 bytes processed by this SA 
Last used 82 seconds ago 
Expirations: 
Hard expiration(1) in 3444 seconds 
Soft expiration(1) in 3084 seconds 
<PI = 297c9f16, Destination = w.x.y.2, Sproto = 51 
Established 26 seconds ago 
Source = a.b.c.d 
Flags (00001082) = <tunneling> 
Crypto ID: 4 
xform = <IPsec AH> 
1 2  bytes processed by this SA 
Last used 21 seconds ago 
Expirations: 
Authentication = <HMAC-MD5> 
Hard expiration(1) in 3574 seconds 
Soft expiration(1) in 3214 seconds 
SPI = f5e7af83, Destination = w.x.y.2, Sproto = 50 
Established 156 seconds ago 
Source = a.b.c.d 
Flags (00001082) = <tunneling> 
Crypto ID: 2 
xform = <IPsec ESP> 
Encryption = <DES> 
Authentication = <HMAC-MD5> 
360 bytes processed by this SA 
Last used 82 seconds ago 
Expirations: 
Hard expiration(1) in 3444 seconds 
Soft expiration(1) in 3084 seconds 
Figure 16: SAs in /kern/ipsec 
The script program of Figure 18 parses the / kern/ipsec file and displays information for current SAs in a more 
compact format as can be seen below (Figure 17). 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
k SAs currently used and their ALGORITHMS * 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
* SAs currently used and their ALGORITHMS * 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
TIME: 10:22:11 
SA# IPsec-Protocol Destination SPI Algorithm 
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. . .. . -. . . . . . . 
TIME: 10:22:13 
SA# IPsec-Protocol Destination SPI Algorithm 
1. ESP 
2. ESP 
a. b. c. d, 248cOd8fI DES 
w.x.y.2, 8c59e724 , DE S 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
* SAs currently used and their ALGORITHMS * 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
TIME: 10:22:27 
SA# IPsec-Protocol Destination SPI Algorithm 
1. ESP a. b. c. d, 248cOd8fI DE S 
2. ESP w.x.y.2, 8c59e124 , DE S 
3. AH w.x.y.2, 2efa696cI MD5 
4. AH a. b. c. d, 5b78fc88 , MD5 
........................................................................ 
Figure 17: Output from SA display script 
More specifically the main routine every 2 seconds generates a copy file of / kern/ipsec (since we cannot process 
directly the kernf s file), and calls an awk routine to process it. The output screen is cleared every 3d time the routine 
is called, so 'up to two successive "instances" of / kern / ips e c are displayed on the same screen. 
The awk routine parses the file with the copied contents of /kern/ipsec, searching for specific info for each SA, 
like: SPI of SA, Destination IP of SA, IPsec protocol, and algorithm. It performs the search, based on the fact that the 
kernel output has a standard format, so certain info appears in the same position within an SA description: 
We have defined in our awk routine that a field is a sequence of characters separated by the next one by a space or a 
newline. 
A line like the one below 
is always part of the first SA description in the kernel output, therefore the first SA description has the above extra 4 
fields. So, an ESP SA description consists of 54 fields, if it is the first in the kernel output, and the IPsec protocol 
information will appear on the 13* field and the algorithm in the 34* for example. For a subsequent ESP SA 
description there is a total of 50 fields, with the protocol information appearing on the 9' field and the algorithm in 
the 30"'. So depending on the total number of fields in the SA description, we search on the proper position for the 
info of interest (Figure 18). 
Hashmask: x, policy entries: y 
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function testProto(inProto, outproto) 
I 





outproto = " ESP" 
if (inproto == "51\n") 
I 




function testAlgorithm(inAlgorithm, outAlgorithm) 
I 





outAlgorithm = "3DES" 





outAlgorithm = "SHAl" 





out A1 go r i t hm = " DE S " 
if (inAlgurithm -- "<HMAC-MDS>\n") 
I 
1 
outAlgorithm = "MD5" 
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Figure 18: SA display script - awk-SA 
10. Comprehensive Sequence of Demonstration Steps 
The necessary files on each peer are: 
Initiator: 
vpn2 8-ah-a 
The QoSS management module in /root: level28-fifo 
rn The configuration and policy files in /etc/isakmpd: isakmpd.conf.medium 





The SA display script in /root: awk-SA 
The configuration and policy files in /etc/isakmpd: isakmpd.conf 
The necessary actions on each peer are: 
Responder: 
Mount k e r n f s :  
isakmpd.policy 
mount -t k e r n f s  /ke rn  / k e r n  
Run the SA display script on a window: 
s h  awk SA 
Start the TKE daemon (preferably in debug mode) in another window. 
isakmpd -d -DA=99 
Run tcpdump on a third window: 
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tcpdump -N -v host a.b.c.d and w.x.y.2 
or 
Run the Ethereal network analyzer 
ether ea 1 
Initiator 
Generate trafficon other windows: 
Run the QoSS management module on a window: 
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APPENDIX A 
Guidelines for installing OpenBSD 2.9 -stable with an X-Windows GUI 
(starting from OpenBSD 2.8 CD) 
A. INSTALL OpenBSD 2.8 from the CD 
Follow guidelines on the CD label. 
Make sure you allocate sufficient space to /usr, /home partitions (>1.5G for each). 
Configure the network connection as well. 
B. AFTERBOOT steps 
1) check all applicable steps described in the af terboot man page 
2) make sure that you run the hos tname command 
3) in /e t c / s ys c t 1 . con f make sure that the IPsec protocols are enabled. The lines below should be uncommented: 
net.inet.esp.enable = 1 
net.inet.ah.enable = 1 
C. COPY SOURCE TREE FROM CD 
1) if it doesn't exist, create directory where cdrom will be mounted 
mkdir -p /cdrom 
2) insert OpenBSD CD 1 
3) mount the cdrom device 
mount -t cd9660 /dev/cdOa /cdrom 
4) go to the directory where the source tree will be created 
cd /usr/src 
5 )  untar and unzip source file 
tar xvfz /cdrom/src.tar.gz 
D. UPDATE SOURCE from CVS TO 2.9-stable 
Commands below given for csh 
1) set method for accessing the anonymous CVS sewer 
setenv CVS-RSH /usr/bin/ssh 
2) set the anonymous CVS server 
setenv CVSROOT anoncvs@anoncvs5.usa.openbsd.org:/cvs 
or anoncvs@anoncvsl.ca.openbsd.org:/cvs 
(or any other anonCVS server that responds at the moment. For a complete list, check 
http://www.openbsd.org/anoncvs.html. Make sure that the server supports ssh.) 
3)setenv CVS IGNORE - REMOTE - ROOT yes 
4) cd /usr/src 
5)cvs -t -d SCVSROOT up -rOPENBSD - -  2 9 -Pd 
and wait for it to finish downloading. 
E. UPDATE X l l -  part I 
(OpenBSD CD 1 should still be mounted from steps C.1-3, otherwise repeat them) 
1)cd /cdrom/2.8/packages/i386 
2) install two necessary packages 
pkg add -v tcl-8.3.2.tgz 
pkg-add  -v tk-8.3.2. tgz 
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3) cd /home 
It is suggested to install X11 source code to /home partition for space reasons. 
4) umount /cdrom 
5) insert and mount OpenBSD'CD 2 
mount -t cd9660 /dev/cdOa /cdrom 
6) untar and unzip X11 source file 
tar xvfz /cdrom/Xll.tar.gz 
F. UPDATE /etc/group 
1) In /etc/group add the line 
auth:*:ll: 
G. CREATE LINK for obiect code directory 
It is suggested that the object code for source code in /usr /src is placed in /home partition for space reasons. 
1) cd /home 
2)mkdir obj 
3) chmod g+w /home/obj 
4)cd /usr 
5)rm -rf /usr/obj 
6)ln -s  /home/obj /usr/obj 
H. REBUILD KERNEL 
1)cd /usr/src/sys/arch/i386/conf 
2) cp GENERIC OLDGENERIC 
Steps 3-5 are for updating the conf ig utility 
3)cd /usr/src/usr.sbin/config 
4)make clean & &  make depend & &  make 




9)make clean & &  make depend & &  make 
This step takes about 1 hour. 
I. REBOOT WITH NEW KERNEL 
1) cp /bsd /bsd.old 
2)cp bsd /bsd 
3) reboot 
J. REBUILD BINARIES 
1) cd /usr/src 
2) rm -r /usr/obj / *  (just in case) 
3)make obj & &  make build 
It's better to make this step right before leaving for the day.. .it takes fiom 6 to 12 hours depending on the machine. 
K. UPDATE X l l -  Dart I1 
1) cd /home/X11 
2) environment variables should be set for CVS update, repeat steps D. 1-3 
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3 ) ~ ~ s  -t UP -PAd 
and wait for it to update X11 source. 
L. UPDATE /e t c and MAKEDEV 
/etc files need updates for X11 to work properly. Step 1 creates in /n updated /etc files, so current /etc files can 
be compared in detail to them (for example with diff -ru /etc/ /n/etc/ 2>&1 I more) and manually 
modified. 
Steps 2-4 describe the necessary changes that came up from such a procedure. 
1)cd /usr/src/etc & &  make distribution-etc-root-var DESTDIR=/n 
2) in / e t c / f bt ab change line 
'/dev/ttyCO 0600  /dev/console 
to 
/dev/ttyCO 0600  /dev/console:/dev/wskbdO:/dev/wsmouseO 
3) in /etc/sysctl. conf change 
'machdep.allowaperture=Z 
4) in /etc/ttys under the line 
ttyC7 "/usr/libexec/getty Pc" vt220 of f  secure 
add the lines 
ttyC8 "/usr/libexec/getty Pc" vt220 o f f  secure 
ttyC9 "/usr/libexec/getty Pc" vt220 off secure 
ttyCa "/usr/libexec/getty Pc" vt220 o f f  secure 
ttyCb "/usr/libexec/getty Pc" vt220 o f f  secure 
5 )  update MAKEDEV 
cp /usr/src/etc/etc.i386/MAKEDEV /dev/MAKEDEV 
6)  /dev/MAKEDEV all 
7) reboot 
K. UPDATE X11 - part I11 
It is suggested that the object code for X11 is built in a different directory than that of object code for /usr /src 
source 
1)cd /var/X11 & &  mv xdm xdm- 
2)test -d /home/obj-Xll & &  mv /home/obj - X11 /home/obj - X11- & &  
rm -rf /home/obj X11- 
3)mkdir -p /home/obj - Xll 
4)cd /home/obj X11 
5)lndir /home/X11 & &  nice make DESTDIR=/ build 
this will take a while.. . 
6 )  run the utility to setup X11 
/usr/XllRG/bin/XF86Setup 
You should know the type of your display card. 
For the mouse, you should select as 
Protocol : wsmouse 
Device: /dev/wsmouse 
and reboot.. . ! 
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APPENDIX B 
Certificate Authority Set-up and Generation of Keys and Certificates 
Assume two hosts, host-A and host-B. host-A will play the role of the Certificate Authority. 
A. Create CA key and certificate on host A 
1) openssl genrsa -out /etc/ssl/private/ca.key 1024 
2) openssl req -new -key /etc/ssl/private/ca.key 
-out /etc/ssl/private/ca.csr 
Here input Common Name: CISR-CA 
.3) openssl x509 -req -days 365 -in /etc/ssl/private/ca.csr 
-signkey /etc/ssl/private/ca.key 
-out /etc/ssl/ca. crt 
Here input subject=/CN=CISR-CA 
4) cp /etc/ssl/ca.crt /etc/isakmpd/ca/. 
B. Create host A key and root@host A certificate on host A' 
5) openssl genrsa -out /etc/i .sakmpd/private/host A.key 1024 
6) openssl req -new -key /etc/isakmpd/private/hogt-A. key 
-out /etc/isakmpd/private/root.host - A.csr 
Here input Common Name: root@host-A.domain 
7) openssl x509 -req -days 365 -in /etc/isakmpd/private/root.host-A.csr 
-CA /etc/ssl/ca.crt 
-CAkey /etc/ssl/private/ca.key -CAcreateserial 
-out /etc/isakmpd/private/root.host-A.crt 
8) certpatch -t ufqdn -i root@host - A.domain -k /etc/ssl/private/ca.key 
Here input subject=/CN= root@host-A.domain 
/etc/isakmpd/private/root.host-A.crt 
/etc/isakmpd/private/root.host-A.crt 
C. Create host B key and root@host B certificate on host A 
9 )  openssl genrsa -out /etc/isakmpd/private/host-B.key 1024 
10) openssl req -new -key /etc/isakmpd/private/host B.key 
-out /etc/isakmpd/private/root . host-B.  csr 
11) openssl x509 -req -days 365 -in /etc/isakmpd/private/root.host - B.csr 
Here input Common Name: root@host-B.domain , , 
-CA /etc/ssl/ca.crt 
-CAkey /etc/ssl/private/ca.key -CAcreateserial 
-out /etc/isakmpd/private/root.host-B.crt 
Here input subject=/CN= root@host-B. domain 
certpatch -t ufqdn -i root@host-B.domain -k /etc/ssl/private/ca.key 12) 
/etc/isakmpd/private/root.host-B.crt 
/etc/isakmpd/private/root.host - B.crt 
13 ) Put on a floppy the files /etc/isakmpd/ca/ca.crt 
/etc/isakmpd/private/root.host B.crt 
/etc/isakmpd/private/host-B . key 
D. Transfer key and certificate on host B 
14 ) From the floppy copy the files 
ca. crt to /etc/isakmpd/ca/ca.crt 
root. host-B. cr't to /etc/isakmpd/private/root.host - B.crt 
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